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Toward Smart Security Enhancement of Federated
Learning Networks
Junjie Tan, Ying-Chang Liang, Nguyen Cong Luong, and Dusit Niyato
Abstract—As traditional centralized learning networks (CLNs)
are facing increasing challenges in terms of privacy preservation,
communication overheads, and scalability, federated learning
networks (FLNs) have been proposed as a promising alternative
paradigm to support the training of machine learning (ML)
models. In contrast to the centralized data storage and processing
in CLNs, FLNs exploit a number of edge devices (EDs) to store
data and perform training distributively. In this way, the EDs
in FLNs can keep training data locally, which preserves privacy
and reduces communication overheads. However, since the model
training within FLNs relies on the contribution of all EDs, the
training process can be disrupted if some of the EDs upload
incorrect or falsified training results, i.e., poisoning attacks. In
this paper, we review the vulnerabilities of FLNs, and partic-
ularly give an overview of poisoning attacks and mainstream
countermeasures. Nevertheless, the existing countermeasures can
only provide passive protection and fail to consider the training
fees paid for the contributions of the EDs, resulting in a unnec-
essarily high training cost. Hence, we present a smart security
enhancement framework for FLNs. In particular, a verify-before-
aggregate (VBA) procedure is developed to identify and remove
the non-benign training results from the EDs. Afterward, deep
reinforcement learning (DRL) is applied to learn the behaving
patterns of the EDs and to actively select the EDs that can provide
benign training results and charge low training fees. Simulation
results reveal that the proposed framework can protect FLNs
effectively and efficiently.
Index Terms—Federated learning network (FLN), security,
poisoning attack, deep reinforcement learning (DRL).
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, tens of billions of connected devices in the world
are generating an unprecedentedly huge amount of data. Due
to the data-driven nature, machine learning (ML) has benefited
greatly from the data explosion and becomes a vital enabler in
many fields, such as computer vision, autonomous cars, and
communications [1]. The core of ML is about training, i.e., to
establish and optimize an ML model, e.g., deep neural network
(DNN), to seek the relationship contained in the training
data, after which the trained ML model can make prediction
or decision-making accurately. In traditional ML paradigms,
ML models are trained within a centralized learning network
(CLN), where a server collects and stores all training data
into a centralized dataset. However, the collection of raw data
not only scarifies privacy but also places heavy burdens on
communication infrastructures. Moreover, the centralized data
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storage and processing are also hardly scalable to the ever-
increasing data.
To overcome the challenges, federated learning (FL) has
been proposed as a favorable alternative of traditional ML
paradigms, transforming CLNs into federated learning net-
works (FLNs) [2]. In an FLN, multiple edge devices (EDs),
e.g., smartphones, train an ML model collaboratively in a
distributed manner under the coordination of a server while
keeping training data locally [3]. Specifically, the EDs use their
own dataset to perform local training parallelly and upload
the results, called model updates, to the server, and the server
aggregates the received results to update the ML model. After
the repeated interactions between the EDs and the server, the
ML model can achieve a satisfactory accuracy, indicating the
completion of training.
Compared with CLNs, FLNs have many advantages. On
the one hand, the EDs do not need to upload raw data,
which avoids privacy concerns and reduces communication
overheads. On the other hand, FLNs exploit the EDs to store
and process data parallelly, which can benefit from the trends
toward massive connected devices and the continuously en-
hanced storage and computation capabilities in each individual
device. Nevertheless, as the training process utilizes the model
updates from the EDs, FLNs are susceptible to poisoning
attacks. In particular, the malicious EDs can falsify and upload
poisoned model updates to the server. Besides, attackers can
hijack the model updates transmitted over insecure connec-
tions. As a result, the server receives and uses poisoned model
updates to obtain a tampered ML model.
In this paper, we first give a brief overview of FLNs and
highlight their vulnerabilities to poisoning attacks. After that,
we present a summary of the potential poisoning attacks
on FLNs and mainstream countermeasures. By analyzing the
existing countermeasures, we find that those methods can only
provide FLNs with passive protection by means of removing
or devaluing part of the model updates received at the server.
Consequently, the existing countermeasures have a low uti-
lization of model updates. The problem becomes even more
severe in the FLNs with incentive mechanisms, i.e., the EDs
charge certain training fees for contributing model updates,
incurring an unnecessarily high training cost. Therefore, we
propose a smart security enhancement framework to address
the issue. In particular, we develop a verify-before-aggregate
(VBA) procedure to enable the server to identify and remove
poisoned model updates. Then, deep reinforcement learning
(DRL) [4] is applied to learn the behaving patterns of the
EDs, which are typically determined by attackers and cannot
be known to the server, from historical identification results.
2Server
ED #1
Training
āāā
ED #2 ED #3 ED #M
Local Data
Centralized Dataset
Server
Model
Update
Local
Dataset
Training Data
ED #1
Local
Model 
Training
Global
Model
Local
Dataset
ED #2
Local
Model 
Training
Local
Dataset
ED #3
Local
Model 
Training
Local
Dataset
ED #M
Local
Model 
Training
āāā
āāā
Global Model Aggregation
(a) Centralized Learning Network (b) Federated Learning Network
Fig. 1. Illustrations of (a) system model of a typical CLN, (b) system model of a typical FLN.
With the learnt knowledge, DRL allows the server to actively
select the EDs that can provide benign model updates at low
training fees. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
framework can offer effective and efficient protection to FLNs.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERATED LEARNING
NETWORKS
A. Components and Functions of FLNs
Conventionally, ML models are trained centrally, assuming
that training data are fully available and stored in a centralized
dataset. Thus, CLNs are designed to support the centralized
training. Fig. 1a shows a typical CLN, which consists of a
server and several EDs. Particularly, the EDs upload their
local data to the server to build the centralized training
dataset, with which the server trains ML models by using
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithms. However, CLNs
face critical issues of privacy violation, heavy communication
overheads, and inscalability.
In view of the above issues, FL is proposed to enable dis-
tributed model training without a centralized training dataset
[2]. As shown in Fig.1b, a typical FLN is also composed
of a server and multiple EDs. In FLNs, an ML model is
trained by two iterative steps, namely the local model training
at the EDs and the global model aggregation at the server.
In the first step, the EDs update their local models with
the global model downloaded from the server, execute SGD
algorithms to train the local models with their own dataset, and
upload the increments of the local models, i.e., model updates,
to the server. In the second step, the server aggregates the
received model updates by adding their average to the previous
global model and obtains a new global model. The two steps
constitute a training round. After multiple training rounds, the
training will be completed once the global model converges.
As such, in FLNs, the server and the EDs only exchange
the ML model parameters, instead of raw data, which avoids
the privacy issues and reduces the communication overheads
significantly.
B. Characteristics and Vulnerabilities of FLNs
FLNs can be deployed flexibly in various environments,
among which the most complicated one is the mobile
implementation. For example, FLN has been adopted to
orchestrate numerous mobile devices from all around
the world to jointly train a language model for Gboard
(https://ai.googleblog.com/2017/04/federated-learning-
collaborative.html), while these mobile devices are owned
by different users and connect to the server using different
types of links, e.g., Wi-Fi and LTE. Therefore, the EDs in an
FLN can be heterogenous in terms of ownership, computing
capabilities, and connections [3]. In addition, since FL relies
on the joint effort of all EDs to train an ML model, the
ML model will be tampered even if only few EDs work
abnormally. Thus, FLNs have a broad attack surface. These
characteristics, i.e., heterogeneity and broad attack surface,
make FLNs vulnerable mainly from two aspects:
• Malicious EDs: As smart devices are nowadays getting
more sophisticated, flaws are inescapable and make the
devices easily compromised by malwares. Meanwhile,
a majority of existing FLN designs do not include an
authentication mechanism, and thus they cannot prevent
attackers from setting up malicious EDs to join FLNs.
• Insecure Connections: The EDs in an FLN may connect
to the server via various connections. It is difficult to
ensure the security of all the connections. For example,
wireless connections are threatened by the openness of
wireless channels. Although advanced encryption and
verification methods can secure the connections, they
induce additional overheads and thus are not always pre-
ferred, especially for some resource-limited IoT devices.
Consequently, there may exist insecure connections, over
which the downloaded global model or the uploaded
model update can be hijacked and manipulated.
By exploiting the vulnerabilities of FLNs, attackers can
inject poisoned model updates, which will tamper the global
model aggregation and decrease the performance, i.e., accu-
3racy, of the ML model. Such attacks are called poisoning
attacks. Next, we describe the poisoning attacks on FLNs and
existing countermeasures.
III. SECURITY ISSUES
A. Poisoning Attacks
Poisoning attacks aim to degrade an accuracy of the ML
model by tampering the global model aggregation of FL with
poisoned model updates. According to the sources of poisoned
model updates, poisoning attacks can be categorized into data
poisoning and model poisoning [5].
1) Data Poisoning: Data poisoning is carried out by means
of modifying the training data in the compromised EDs. In
particular, attackers flip the labels of training data, such that the
compromised EDs train the local models using the poisoned
data and generate incorrect model updates. Depending on
the attack intention, the labels can be flipped randomly or
specifically. On the one hand, unintentional attacks target at
decreasing the prediction accuracy on all classes, and thus
attackers can flip the labels randomly [6]–[8]. On the other
hand, intentional attacks intend to make the ML model achieve
a low accuracy on only certain classes, for which reason
attackers only flip the labels of the training data in the
concerned classes [8], [9].
2) Model Poisoning: Instead of modifying training data,
model poisoning produces poisoned model updates directly ac-
cording to some pre-defined rules. For example, [10] considers
that poisoned model updates can be sampled from a Gaussian
distribution. Moreover, attackers can manipulate benign model
updates into poisoned ones. In [10]–[12], malicious EDs are
designed to flip the sign of benign model updates, in order
to guide the aggregated global model towards the direction of
decreasing accuracy. Similarly, [13] designs poisoned model
updates as the negative increment of the global model, leading
to the reverse update of the global model. In fact, all the above
attacks are unintentional as defined before. Alternatively, in-
tentional model poisoning methods are considered in [8], [12]
and [14], where attackers use a pre-designed compromised
model to craft poisoned model updates, aiming to replace the
training ML model with the compromised model.
In addition, a scale factor is introduced in [8], [10], and
[14] to magnify poisoned model updates, with the objective
to further amplify attack effects.
B. Countermeasures
In the literature, there mainly exist three types of counter-
measures to mitigate the poisoning attacks on FLNs, namely
the robust aggregation methods, the anomaly detection-based
methods, and the hyper methods.
1) Robust Aggregation: In FLNs, the server aggregates
the received model updates by taking the average, allowing
poisoned model updates to bias the global model directly.
Hence, it is highly demanded to develop the aggregation
methods that are robust to poisoned model updates. COMED,
GEOMED, and COTMED are the commonly-used robust ag-
gregation methods, which are proposed to replace the average
operation with component-wise median, geometric median,
and component-wise trimmed median, respectively [7], [10].
Another method called KRUM is proposed in [10], which
updates the global model by only using the most representative
model update, i.e., the one with the shortest Euclidean dis-
tances from others. In [14], each model update is preprocessed
to be within a bounded norm to prevent the global model
from being overwhelmed by only few poisoned model updates.
For the same purpose, [11] proposes a robust stochastic
aggregation (RSA) method, in which the server binarizes the
received model updates before updating the global model.
2) Anomaly Detection: Benign and poisoned model updates
have different objectives, making them implicitly different in
mathematics. The anomaly detection-based methods aim to
classify model updates by identifying the differences among
them. For example, [6] and [12] propose to analyze model
updates respectively by calculating their cosine similarities
and by mapping them into a low-dimensional latent space.
Then, the outliers, i.e., poisoned model updates, can be found
and removed based on the obtained cosine similarities or the
mapped low-dimensional representations.
3) Hyper: The hyper methods are proposed by combining
the above two types of methods to put their merits into full
use. In particular, the server needs to first evaluate the received
model updates and then aggregate them in a robust way.
For example, in [13], COMED, COTMED, and KRUM are
enhanced with a preliminary evaluation procedure, where a
model update will be discarded if it achieves an unacceptable
loss or accuracy on an auxiliary dataset. Instead of simply
discarding model updates, the methods proposed in [8] and
[9] choose to reweight model updates based on the evalu-
ation results. In [8], the server analyzes model updates by
using a repeated median estimator, and builds an accumulated
confidence record for each ED. According to the confidence
records, model updates are reweighted for aggregation. In
contrast, the method in [9] is designed to reweight model
updates based on their cosine similarities.
C. Discussions and Open Issues
We summarize the poisoning attacks and countermeasures
in Table I. From the table, the existing countermeasures
are designed to prevent the global model from aggregating
poisoned model updates, by way of discarding or devaluing
part of the received model updates. For example, in KRUM,
only the most representative model update can be used to
update the global model, while the others are all dropped. In
this sense, the existing countermeasures under-utilize model
updates.
The under-utilization issue can be negligible if the server
can obtain model updates for free. However, in practice, it is
not guaranteed that the EDs naturally volunteer to contribute
because they may not be interested in the model learnt by
the server. Instead, as the owners of many valuable data, the
EDs need to consume both computation and communication
resources if they are asked to join the FL process. Hence,
it is more practical to consider the existence of an incentive
mechanism in FLNs, i.e., the EDs charge the server with
training fees for contributing model updates [5]. To the best of
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SUMMARY OF POISONING ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES.
澳
Attack Type Description Attack Method Target Ref. 
Data Poisoning 
Attackers modify the training 
data in the EDs, making EDs 
training incorrectly and generate 
poisoned model updates. 
Flip the labels of the training data randomly Unintentional [6],[7],[8] 
Flip the labels of the training data in certain classes Intentional [8],[9] 
Model Poisoning 
Attackers create poisoned model 
updates by manipulating benign 
model updates or according to 
pre-designed rules. 
Generate model updates from Gaussian distribution 
Unintentional 
[10] 
Flip the sign of benign model updates [10],[11],[12] 
Use negative increments of the global model as 
model updates 
[13] 
Generate model updates based on a pre-designed 
compromised model 
Intentional [8],[12],[14] 
澳
Defense Type Description Countermeasure Ref. 
Robust Aggregation 
The server aggregates model 
updates according to a special 
rule, instead of simply taking 
the average. 
Median based methods (COMED, GEOMED, COTMED):  aggregate model 
updates using median (or geometric median, trimmed median) values  
[7],[10] 
KRUM: use the most representative model update to update the global model [10] 
Preprocess model updates to with a bounded norm before the aggregation [14] 
RSA:  binarize model updates before the aggregation [11] 
Anomaly Detection 
The server detects and then 
removes or devalues poisoned 
model updates. 
Detect and remove poisoned model updates based on cosine similarity [6] 
Detect and remove poisoned model updates by using a mapping into low-
dimensional latent space 
[12] 
Hyper 
A combination of robust 
aggregation and anomaly 
detection. 
Evaluate model updates using an auxiliary dataset, and then aggregate the 
acceptable ones using COMED, COTMED or KRUM 
[13] 
Record an accumulated confidence for each ED and reweight model updates 
according to the confidence 
[8] 
Reweight model updates based on their cosine similarities [9] 
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Fig. 2. Illustrations of (a) system model of the considered FLN with M EDs, (b) VBA procedure.
our knowledge, there is a lack of effective security schemes
that can deal with poisoning attacks while maintaining low
training costs, which motivates us to develop a smart security
enhancement framework.
IV. A SMART SECURITY ENHANCEMENT FRAMEWORK
FOR FEDERATED LEARNING NETWORKS
A. FLN with Poisoning Attacks
In this paper, we consider an FLN with a server and M
EDs, as shown in Fig. 2a. Particularly, the server pays and
orchestrates the EDs to train ML models. Without loss of
generality, the ML model is assumed to a DNN. Training the
DNN requires multiple training rounds to complete. As an
ED needs to invest resources once requested to participate in
a training round, the EDs on request will charge the server
with training fees before training local DNNs and uploading
model updates. The details of each training round are shown
in Fig. 2a. In the FLN, attackers can exploit the malicious EDs
and the insecure connections to launch poisoning attacks. We
refer the malicious EDs and the benign EDs with insecure
connections to as vulnerable EDs, which can inject poisoned
model updates if they are attacked successfully. In contrast, the
benign EDs with secure connections are referred to as secure
benign EDs, which are free from attacks and always contribute
benign model updates.
To handle poisoned model updates, we propose a VBA
procedure. As Fig. 2b shows, the server first obtains temporary
DNNs by adding each model update one at a time to the
5previous global DNN. Then, the temporary DNNs are tested
on an auxiliary dataset. If a temporary DNN can achieve
acceptable accuracy, i.e., does not decrease the accuracy of
the previous global DNN by a threshold, the corresponding
model update is identified to be benign. The threshold exists
to deal with the fact that a benign model update may still
decrease the accuracy mildly due to natural fluctuations, and
it can be designed empirically to be a small value slightly
larger than zero. Finally, the server updates the global DNN
with the identified benign model updates.
In principle, the VBA procedure leverages the auxiliary
dataset to determine whether a model update is poisoned or
not. Thus, a proper auxiliary dataset should be representative
of the pattern that the DNN learns, such that the accuracy
degradations caused by poisoned model updates can be de-
tected. We notice that the server typically has a set of test
data, which are generally provided by the task publisher to
evaluate the learnt DNN. Hence, we can use the test dataset as
the auxiliary dataset. Note that although the VBA procedure
is designed for poisoning attacks, it can be enhanced with
extra methods to handle extensive cases. For example, lazy
EDs may simply upload historical global model increments
to cheat training fees. In this case, the VBA procedure can
be additionally enhanced by checking the similarities between
the received model updates and the historical global model
increments. Since the server knows all the historical global
model increments, the lazy EDs can be detected effectively as
long as they copy any of them, even at the end of training.
In fact, the lazy EDs tend to copy the recent global model
increments to avoid destroying system performance, and thus
the server only needs to store and use a few global model
increments in the similarity check.
With the VBA procedure, poisoned model updates can be
dropped, but the corresponding EDs have already been paid.
Thus, it is highly desired to actively select appropriate EDs
for each training round, with the objective to obtain the most
benign model updates at the least training costs (i.e., the total
training fees paid to the EDs). However, the server does not
have enough information to select those appropriate EDs at the
beginning of a training round. The reasons are two-fold. First,
the behavior of vulnerable EDs is determined by attackers.
Due to the malicious intention, attackers are impossible to
inform the up-coming attacks in advance. Second, a model
update cannot be recognized to be benign or not until it has
been uploaded, while only the selected EDs can upload model
updates in each training round. In other words, the server
can only have a partial and historical observation of the EDs.
Fortunately, the emergence of DRL makes it possible to make
decisions without sufficient information. Next, we develop a
smart ED selection strategy based on DRL, which empowers
the server to learn the behavior of the EDs and to select EDs
properly for each training round.
B. A DRL-based ED Selection Strategy
DRL is an important ML technique developed for decision-
making in a dynamic environment [1], [4]. Specifically, the
decision maker, called agent, can learn environmental patterns
and an optimal decision-making policy without requiring prior
knowledge about the environment. Hence, if we respectively
model the server and the EDs as the agent and the environ-
ment, DRL can be used to enable the server to learn the
behaving patterns of the EDs and to select the proper EDs,
despite lacking sufficient prior knowledge.
To apply DRL, the interactions between the server and
the EDs should be formulated as a Markov decision process
(MDP), which consists of three key elements, namely state,
action, and reward. At the beginning of a training round, a
state is obtained by the server as the basis of decision-making,
and thus it includes the status of all EDs, i.e., whether their
previously uploaded model updates are benign or not. Then,
the server takes an action, i.e., selects a set of EDs. After
collecting all the model updates, the server will receive a
reward to indicate how good the taken action is. To encourage
the server to obtain more benign model updates at lower
training costs, we design the reward to be the number of
received benign model updates minus the training costs, which
is also the utility of the training round.
Solving the formulated MDP is to find the optimal ED
selection policy that maximizes the long-term cumulative
discounted reward. DRL can solve the MDP effectively, of
which the key idea is to establish a deep Q-network (DQN) to
approximate the Q-values for each state-action pair, i.e., the
cumulative discounted rewards achieved by taking each action
in each state [1]. The DQN is a DNN containing an input layer,
an output layer, and some hidden layers. Given a specific state
as the input, the DQN can predict the Q-value for each action.
To achieve accurate predictions, the DQN needs to be trained
by a trial-and-error procedure, in which the agent generates
experience by continuously interacting with the environment
and feeding the recoded experience into the DQN. The DQN
will eventually converge after analyzing massive historical
experience. With the converged DQN, the server can always
select the most appropriate EDs by choosing the action with
the largest Q-value, as long as a state is given. Note that we
do not provide all technical details due to space limit. The
interested readers can refer to [1] and [4] for more details
about DRL.
Nevertheless, it is not the end of the story. Recall that
only the EDs selected in a training round can upload model
updates, while the status of an ED needs to be determined by
running the VBA procedure with its model update received
at the server. Therefore, the server can only have a partial
observation of the state, which transforms the MDP into a
partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) [1].
The information included in a single observation is incomplete,
but fortunately we notice that the historical status of the uns-
elected EDs can help to supplement the missing information.
In other words, a state can be predicted from the present
observation and some historical observations. Following this
idea, we first define a pseudo state as a sequence of present and
historical observations, and the corresponding taken actions.
Next, we design a deep recurrent Q-network (DRQN) [15]
by inserting a long-short-term-memory (LSTM) layer into the
vanilla DQN. LSTM is kind of DNN structure designed for
analyzing sequential data, e.g., a period of sound waves. Since
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Fig. 4. The efficiency of the proposed framework.
the pseudo state is exactly a time sequence of observations and
actions, LSTM can be used to analyze the pseudo state and to
predict the real state behind it. After the analysis of LSTM, a
predicted state can be extracted from the pseudo state and be
handled by the DQN.
C. Numerical Results
In this part, we conduct simulations to evaluate the proposed
smart security enhancement framework in an FLN with ten
EDs, including both secure benign EDs and vulnerable EDs.
Since vulnerable EDs may upload poisoned model updates,
they tend to set a lower price than that of secure benign EDs
to attract more requests. In particular, the secure benign EDs
and the vulnerable EDs are considered to respectively charge
the price of 0.9 and 0.3 for each request. If a vulnerable ED
is under attack, the labels of training data will be flipped
randomly. Moreover, a scale factor is imposed to magnify
the poisoned model updates by 20 times. Considering that
attackers can launch attacks dynamically, the vulnerable EDs
behave differently in each training round, i.e., each vulnerable
ED can successfully upload a benign model update according
to a hidden pattern.
We consider that 20 learning tasks are published to the
FLN, which we simulate by repeatedly training a DNN over
an MNIST dataset with 60000 training samples and 10000
test samples. The training samples are distributed to each ED
equally. The DNN to be learnt contains 2 fully-connected (FC)
hidden layers with 100 neurons in each layer. Each learning
task consists of 1000 training rounds, and five EDs will be
selected in each round to train locally with the minibatch size
of 100 for 1 epoch, using Adam as the SGD optimizer. As for
the DRQN, it contains an LSTM hidden layer with 32 LSTM
units and an FC hidden layer with 200 neurons. Each pseudo
state contains three successive observations. The threshold in
VBA is set to be 0.005. Additionally, we take the FedAvg [3]
and the COMED algorithms as the benchmark algorithms. For
the proposed framework, we consider the full implementation,
i.e., “VBA+DRL”, and the VBA-only implementation, where
the VBA procedure works with random ED selection.
We evaluate and depict in Fig. 3 the performance of the
four schemes by increasing the number of the vulnerable EDs
from 3 to 9. Fig. 3a shows the test accuracy of the DNNs
after training, and each data point is the average result of
all learning tasks. As seen, the test accuracy of the DNNs
trained by the benchmark algorithms is degraded significantly
due to attacks. In particular, the FedAvg algorithm is the
worst because it does not have any robustness design. For
the COMED algorithm, it can train DNNs to achieve an
acceptable accuracy of around 96% at the presence of three
vulnerable EDs but fails to prevent severe degradation with
more vulnerable EDs. In contrast, with either implementation,
the DNNs trained by the proposed framework can always reach
7an accuracy of over 97%, regardless of the number of the
vulnerable EDs in the network. This demonstrates that the
VBA procedure can protect the FLN from poisoning attacks
effectively. Fig. 3b shows the average utility of each training
round. From the figure, the VBA-only implementation and
the benchmark algorithms achieve lower utility with more
vulnerable EDs. This is because they all select EDs randomly
while the growth of vulnerable EDs increases the chance
of obtaining poisoned model updates. Meanwhile, the full
implementation of our proposed framework can achieve higher
utility. The reasons are two-fold. First, more vulnerable EDs
bring in more potential benign model updates charging low
training fees. Second, enabled by DRL, the server can select
EDs smartly after considering both attacks and training costs.
Hence, compared with the random ED selection, the DRL-
based one can obtain more low-cost and benign model updates.
Next, we look at the efficiency of the proposed framework
by taking the case with 9 vulnerable EDs for example. Fig.
4a shows the evolution of the rewards achieved by DRL for
20000 training rounds in the full implementation, which cover
all the 20 learning tasks. As seen, DRL takes around 8000
training rounds (i.e., 8 learning tasks) to converge. Note that
although DRL needs some time to converge, it can maintain
high performance afterwards. Thus, the convergence time is
tolerable from a long-term perspective of the FLN. We further
depict in Fig. 4b the impacts of DRL on the convergence
speed of federated learning. In particular, the red curve shows
the evolution of the test accuracy of the DNN trained in the
last learning task, where DRL has converged, while the black
curve shows that in the first learning task, where DRL just
starts to learn and has not converged. For comparison, Fig.
4b also shows the evolution of the VBA-only implementation,
and each data point is the average result of all learning tasks.
As seen, the accuracy increases sharply and can converge
at around 600 training rounds for the last task. As for the
first task, the convergence rate is slower and the curve is
the same as that of the VBA-only implementation. Hence,
as DRL is converging, FL can achieve better convergence
performance. Meanwhile, even before the convergence, the
performance of the DRL-based ED selection is not worse
than that of the random ED selection. Finally, in Fig. 4c, we
compare the four schemes regarding the average time for each
training round. Compared with the benchmark algorithms,
the proposed framework has higher latency due to the more
complicated aggregation procedure. However, the VBA-only
and the full implementations can still finish a training round
respectively within 279ms and 297ms. In practice, the FLN
can choose either implementation depending on the practical
latency or computation requirements.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As FLNs are susceptible to poisoning attacks, where attack-
ers attempt to disrupt the training process of FL by injecting
poisoned model updates, we have investigated the security is-
sues of FLNs in this paper. In particular, we have first reviewed
the vulnerabilities of FLNs, and then provided an overview of
poisoning attacks and mainstream countermeasures. However,
it has been found that the existing countermeasures fail to
consider the costs of requesting EDs to contribute model
updates and under-utilize model updates, leading to inefficient
training. Therefore, we have proposed a smart security en-
hancement framework to address this issue. In the proposed
framework, we have designed a VBA procedure for identifying
and removing poisoned model updates and a DRL-based ED
selection strategy for intelligently selecting the EDs that can
provide low-cost and benign model updates. Numerical results
have demonstrated that the proposed framework can protect
FLNs effectively and efficiently.
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